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MANDATES OF THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PARTY
CLASH WITH INTERESTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL
STATES AS THE PARTY EXECUTES ITS POLICY BY
ABOLITION OF STATE DELEGATE SELECTION RE-
SULTS: LEGAL ISSUES OF THE 1972 DEMOCRATIC
CONVENTION AND BEYOND
INTRODUCTION
The courts have rarely intervened into the activities of political par-
ties, preferring to allow the parties to resolve internal conflicts through
their own machinery.' This attitude of restraint has been especially
marked in reference to national political parties. 2
Pre-convention 1972 provided the Supreme Court with an oppor-
tunity to rewrite its philosophical premises in this field of court-political
party relations. However, the Court decided in O'Brien v. Brown3 to,
1. A notable exception to judicial abstention has been racial discrimination by
direct or indirect exclusion of Negroes from voting rights in state party primaries or
club polls. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73
(1932); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953). The group of cases came to be known as the Texas White Primary Cases.
Another exception has been the Reapportionment Case of Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368 (1963), in which the principle of "one man, one vote" was applied to a
political party primary.
2. It is noteworthy that the national political parties have not yet been subject to
the reapportionment principles in their methods of delegate selection and allocation.
The lower federal courts have split on whether those principles apply to national
political parties. Even the court that found the principles applicable decided that the
National Democratic Party's allocation amalgam of "one Democrat, one vote" and
"one man, one vote" complied with the mandates of those cases. Compare Bode v.
National Democratic Party, 452 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied 404 U.S.
1019 (1972) with Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-ILabor Party, 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.
1968).
See Bain, Convention Decisions and Voting Records (Brookings, 1960) which
documents over one hundred years of credential disputes decided solely by the Repub-
lican or Democratic Party national convention mechanism.
3. O'Brien v. Brown and Keane v. National Democratic Party, 92 S.Ct. 2718
(1972).
O'Brien involved the credential challenge out of California. Keane was the com-
panion case concerning Illinois' delegate seating dispute.
The Court in distinguishing prior intrusions into political party affairs footnoted this
comment:
This is not a case in which claims are made that injury arises from invidious
discrimination based on race in a primary contest within a single state. (Cita-
tions omitted.)
92 S. Ct. 2718, 2720 n.1 (1972).
Ten years earlier the Court had inserted a cautionary footnote in Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 368, 378 n.10 (1963) that it was not deciding reapportionment principles for
an analogous national political party nominating convention.
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at least temporarily, leave a national political party to its hybrid exist-
ence as an association private yet quasi-governmental (as its role in the
elective process illustrates), voluntary yet vital (as its history in viable
political candidacies attests), and deliberative yet spontaneous (as its
volatile political climate always exhibits).
Since this decision to refrain is not now perfectly clear, given the
Court's October, 1972 remand of Keane v. National Democratic Party
to the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals,4 and since the
Court had indicated in its July, 1972, stay order opinion that it or
other courts may yet consider the matter under more favorable circum-
stances, 5 the 1972 controversies and their issues remain important.
For these reasons, the permissibility and the capability of a court in-
volving itself in the subject matter of, for example, delegate selection
Guidelines, which were the crux of the 1972 National Democratic
Party Convention disputes, will be considered. The legal issues raised
by those confrontations and a forecast of their resolution will also be
developed. Speculation as to the status of a national political party
policy guideline in relation to conflicting state electoral law will be dis-
cussed. Finally, the timing and remedy options available to a court
fashioning a judicial disposition will be treated.
RECENT HISTORY
The 1972 National Democratic Convention, embroiled in the appli-
cation of a new set of democratic delegate selection Guidelines, voted
4. While the Court viewed the California challenge as moot and remanded it "with
directions to dismiss the case as moot", O'Brien v. Brown, 41 U.S.L.W. 3182 (U.S.
October 10, 1972), it had this to say about the Illinois challenge:
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated,
and the case is remanded to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit to determine whether this case has become moot. Keane v.
National Democratic Party, 41 U.S.L.W. 3182 (U.S. October 10, 1972.)
As will be developed below (see p. 166 infra) collateral effects such as a state court
injunction violation related to these events and the right to vote for national commit-
teeman and committeewoman remain unresolved in Illinois. This may be the basis
for considering the California challenge moot while reserving the opinion in the Illinois
challenge.
5. O'Brien v. Brown, 92 S. Ct 2718 (1972). The Court advised:
The Court is now asked to review these novel and important questions and to
resolve them within the remaining days prior to the opening sessions of the
convention now scheduled to be convened Monday, July 10, 1972.
The Court concludes it cannot in this limited time give to these issues the
consideration warranted for final decision on the merits. We therefore take no
action on the petitions for certiorari at this time. Id., at 2719.
The Court further added:
If this system is to be altered by federal courts in the exercise of their extra-
ordinary equity powers, it should not be done under the circumstances and
time pressures surrounding the actions brought in the District Court, and the
expedited review in the Court of Appeals and in this Court. (Emphasis
added) Id., at 2720.
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at various stages to alter the state electoral results in two delegations.
Acting upon its Credentials Committee's recommendation of June 30,
1972,6 the Convention voted on July 10, 1972 to unseat a portion of
the Illinois delegation on the grounds that its state party organization
exerted excessive influence in effectuating the election of 59 uncom-
mitted delegates-a violation of that national party's new guidelines.7
The Credentials Committee also recommended a change in the impact
of California's "winner-take-all" primary law by apportionment of the
delegates to the various candidates according to their popular vote
support in that primary.8 This recommendation was influenced by a
Guideline interpretation that a prohibition of the unit rule extended
mandatorily to "winner-take-all" primaries and was necessary to
achieve effective minority expression. It was later defeated on the con-
vention floor.'
The issues find their origin in 1968 when the National Democratic
Party Convention approved this mandate:
It is understood that a State Democratic Party in selecting and
certifying delegates to the National Convention thereby under-
takes to assure that such delegates have been selected through a
process in which all Democratic voters have had a full and timely
opportunity to participate.
In determining whether a state party has complied with this
mandate, the convention shall require that:
(1) The unit rule not be used in any stage of the delegate se-
lection process; and
(2) All feasible efforts have been made to assure that delegates
are selected through party primary, convention or committee pro-
cedures open to public participation within the calendar year of
the National Convention.'0
To implement this broad charge, the 1968 Convention authorized
the Democratic Party National Committee to appoint a Commission
on Party Structure and Delegate Selection to study current selection
methods and to elaborate upon the mandate based upon those studies."
6. Chicago Tribune, July 1, 1972, at 1, col. 5.
Since it normally requires many months before the actual convention proceedings are
printed, secondary reports must serve as substitute documentation.
7. Chicago Tribune, July 12, 1972 at 1, col. 1.
8. Chicago Tribune, July 1, 1972 at 3, col. 3.
9. Chicago Tribune, July 11, 1972 at 1, col. 1.
10. 1968 DEMOCRATIC PROCEEDINGS, #269.
11. COMMISSION ON PARTY STRUCTURE AND DELEGATE SELECTION, MANDATE FOE
REFORM 10 [hereinafter cited as MANDATE FOR REFORM], the Commission literature
describing the history behind its appointment.
For an elaborate chronicle of how the 1968 Convention sired the Commission and of
prior conventions' credential challenges, see the MANDATE FOR REFORM, supra; Schmidt
and Whalen, Credentials Contests and the 1968 and 1972 Democratic National Con-
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After months of analysis, which divulged many patently undemocratic
delegate selection procedures and statistics, 2 the Commission in April,
1970, published the Guidelines, representing the Commission's inter-
pretation of the 1968 mandate. 3 To indicate the project's serious
purpose, the Commission literature, the Mandate for Reform, con-
tained this language in explaining the significance of the "all feasible
efforts" clause in the mandate above:
'All feasible efforts' means that the state Party has held hearings,
introduced bills, worked for their enactment, and amended its
rules in every necessary way short of exposing the Party or its
members to legal sanctions [to conform with those Guidelines].' 4
The Call of the 1972 Convention adopted these Guidelines."
When Chicago's regular party organization candidates swept the
delegate elections in the March 21, 1972, Illinois primary,'6 and Sena-
tor George McGovern won the California "winner-take-all" primary,'I
ventions, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1438 (1969); and Segal, Delegate Selection Standards: the
Democratic Party's Experience, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 873 (1970).
12. Some of the findings expressed in the report dramatize the inequities:
(a) more than one third of the delegates had been selected prior to 1968,
thus before the emergence of the major issues and candidates, including
the virtual selection in twelve states before President Johnson withdrew
[MANDATE FOR REFORM 10];
(b) delegations which were
(i) 5% Black despite that minority constituting at least 20% of the
Democratic Party's membership;
(ii) 13% women;(iii) 13% lower middle class whereas 70% of the population have
annual incomes under $10,000;
(iv) over 50% of the delegations with no more than one delegate un-
der 30 years old;
[MANDATE FOR REFORM 11] ;
(c) five states using purely party committees to effectuate the selection of
delegates, and the virtual gubernatorial appointment in two states(Georgia and Louisiana). [MANDATE FOR REFORM 20-21];
(d) the less dramatic but frequently present irregularities in the areas of:
(i) unit rules diluting minority expression and prohibiting conscience-
motivated expression contrary to the majority result;
(ii) lack of public notice of party procedure in the delegate selection
field;
(iii) slate-making and subsequent favoritism by "official" decision mak-
ing bodies.
[MANDATE FOR REFORM 22-25].
Ironically, it was these less dramatically offensive procedures which precipitated the
Illinois and California challenges, which serve as the background for this article.
13. MANDATE FOR REFORM, 38-48.
14. Id. at 37.
15. The Official Call for the 1972 Democratic National Convention 12 (1971)
which said:
The Democratic National Convention adopts such Guidelines as the standards
that state Democratic Parties in qualifying and certifying delegates to the
1972 Democratic National Convention must make all efforts to comply with
16. Chicago Tribune, March 23, 1972 at 4, col. 3.
Thirty-seven of the fifty Chicago ward committeemen were represented in the dele-
gation.
17. TIME, June 19, 1972, vol. 99 at p. 13.
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the wheels of challenge began to churn. The viability of the Guide-
lines and the authority of a national political party to enforce them
would be tested.
These challenges finally culminated in the summer of '72 in pro-
ceedings before the Credentials Committee, the District of Columbia
Courts, the Supreme Court, and the Convention floor. The arbiter
was the Convention itself and its decisions are now well-known recent
history. California sat fully committed to Senator George McGovern.
Mayor Richard Daley's Chicago forces went home to Illinois, their seats
occupied by a group of challengers. The federal courts, consistent with
tradition, observed the proceedings with the rest of the nation.' 8
18. The Illinois challenge presents an extremely confusing factual setting. Under
different names and sometimes parties, this case proceeded at various stages in multiple
jurisdictional environments.
There were three stops in the Cook County Circuit Court (Illinois' trial court) be-
fore two different judges, one excusing himself after being accused of prejudice by the
challengers. These proceedings basically involved an April, 1972, filing, a removal
that same month to the Illinois federal courts, a June remand to the state courts, a
pre-convention injunction against the challengers, and post-convention contempt activity.
Wigoda v. Cousins, No. 72 CH 2288 (I11. Cir. Ct. 1972). An emergency appeal to the
Illinois Supreme Court initiated by the challengers after the convention was denied.
Wigoda v. Cousins (IlL Sup. Ct. August 4, 1972).
There were also proceedings in Illinois' federal courts prior to the convention with
each side seeking injunctions against the other. In June, District Court Judge Will re-
manded an injunction case against the challengers to the state court, in which it
originated, for a want of subject matter jurisdiction. Wigoda v. Cousins, 342
F. Supp. 82 (N.D. I11. 1972). While the challengers later won a district court
battle in the court of Judge McGarr for an injunction against the elected dele-
gation from proceeding in the state courts, Cousins v. Wigoda, 72 C 1108 (N.D. Ill.
June 9, 1972), the Seventh Circuit, reviewing both district court actions, concurred in
the analysis of Judge Will and vacated the injunction. Wigoda v. Cousins, No. 72-1384
(7th Cir. June 30, 1972); Cousins v. Wigoda, No. 72-1455 (7th Cir. June 30, 1972).
Then, there was the June and July activity in the District of Columbia. Twice the
District Court and Judge Hart were involved, the first case dismissed on appeal since
the Credentials Committee had not yet acted. Keane v. National Democratic Party,
No. 1010-72 (D.D.C. June 19, 1972); Keane v. National Democratic Party, No. 72-
1562 (D.C. Cir. June 20, 1972). After the Credentials Committee voted against the
elected delegations in the Illinois and California challenges in early July, the two dele-
gations' complaints were treated by the District of Columbia Courts as companion cases.
While the action was now directed against the party rather than the challengers, the
Illinois challengers intervened and counter-claimed with the party for an injunction
against state court proceedings. Keane v. National Democratic Party, No. 1010-72
(D.D.C. July 3, 1972); Keane v. Cousins, No. 1320-72 (D.D.C. July 3, 1972). After
the District Court upheld the Credentials Committee recommendations, the D.C. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals assumed jurisdiction, upholding the Committee on the Illinois
issue and granting an injunction against state court proceedings to the challengers.
Keane v. National Democratic Party, No. 72-1629 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 1972). Keane
v. Cousins, No. 72-1631 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 1972). This court was to become enmeshed
in the Illinois affair twice more, once to interpret whether the Supreme Court stay or-
der of the July D.C. Circuit judgment also suspended Illinois' state court proceedings,
Keane v. Cousins, No. 72-1631 (August 3, 1972), and again to determine whether the
matter was moot upon the Supreme Court's October vacation of the D.C. Circuit order
and remand to that court. Keane v. National Democratic Party, 41 U.S.L.W. 3182
(U.S. October 10, 1972).
On July 1, 1972, shortly before the Convention, there was an appearance before
Justice Rehnqust, sitting as emergency appeals Circuit Justice, in which the challengers
sought to enjoin Illinois state court proceedings. It was denied. Cousins v. Wigoda,
92 S. Ct. 2610 (Emer. CL App. 1972).
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NATIONAL
DEMOCRATIC PARTY GUIDELINES
Most would agree that the goals of the National Democratic Party
Guidelines, which precipitated the 1972 convention controversies, are
praiseworthy aims expressive of an ideal of democratic government-
full meaningful participation by all members of a vital political organi-
zation.' 9 However, other ideals such as those expressed in our Con-
stitution must not be cast aside in the building process. The D.C. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals expressed this concept well in its July, 1972,
opinion going to the merits of the Convention controversies:
We recognize that some consider the change adopted by the
Party to be a laudable one and the direction of recent attempts at
Democratic Party reform is quite plainly toward the principle of
proportioned representation and maximum participation of minor-
ity views. But the process by which that result is reached is
necessarily as important as the result itself. We cannot be blind
to the fundamental deficiencies in the fairness of the process of
reaching that result. Nor can we overlook the injuries to which
those deficiencies gave rise. 20
If those other ideals are to be affected in striving for full representation,
the inroads must be narrowly construed. Certain National Democratic
There were then the proceedings before the entire Supreme Court, which logically
should have resolved all conflict but did not insofar as the petitions for certiorari were
not ruled on initially and the effect of their stay order on state court activity was not
explicated. O'Brien v. Brown (the California challenge case) and Keane v. National
Democratic Party, 92 S. Ct. 2718 (1972). The effect of the proceedings were further
clouded by its post-convention remand to the D.C. Circuit to consider whether the
Illinois affair was moot. Keane v. National Democratic Party, 41 U.S.L.W. 3182 (U.S.
October 10, 1972).
By contrast, the California challenge was uncomplicated. In the week before the
Convention, it routinely if rapidly followed the normal procedural course from the fed-
eral district court to the federal circuit court to the United States Supreme Court.
Brown v. O'Brien, No. 315-72 (D.D.C. July 3, 1972), rev'd, No. 72-1628 (D.C. Cir.
July 5, 1972), stayed, 92 S. Ct. 2718 (1972), vacated, 41 U.S.L.W. 3182 (U.S. Octo-
ber 10, 1972).
19. One political analysist is of the opinion that old-time conventions dominated
by party bosses is the system most responsive to the electorate since these figures truly
have a stake in the outcome. Winning elections is a crucial prerequisite to their live-
lihood. He says:
The motivational force behind the selection -of party candidates ought to be
that of winning the election. Any trade-off between ideological purity and
voter appeal ought to favor the latter. This statement of the problem suggests
that the convention ought to be populated by 'professional' politicians rather
than 'amateurs' . . . When a group of people are more concerned with win-
ning elections by pleasing a majority of the voters than in adopting any spe-
cific policy, they would be more willing to modify their behavior to fit the
desires of the public.
Goldstein, One Man, One Vote and the Political Convention. Alternative Methods of
Implementation: A Political Analysis, 40 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1971).
20. Brown v. O'Brien, No. 72-1628, Keane v. National Democratic Party, No. 72-
1629, Keane v. National Democratic Party, No. 72-1630, Keane v. Cousins, No. 72-
1631, Slip Opinion 10 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 1972).
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Party Guidelines as currently drafted appear to be consitutionally in-
firm media to that end.
Two areas of the Guidelines stand out as rugged attempts to achieve
the objectives of democratization-those treating slate-making and dis-
crimination. Guidelines speaking to these problem areas were violated
by a portion of the delegation elected from Illinois according to the
party's hearing officer and its Credentials Committee. 2
Guideline C-4 muzzles for purposes of delegate selection the voices
of officials elected or appointed before the calendar year of the dele-
gate elections. It provides in pertinent part:
[T]he Commission requires State Parties to prohibit any practices
by which officials elected or appointed before the calendar year
(of the Convention) choose nominating committees or propose or
endorse a slate of candidates--even when the possibility for a chal-
lenge to such slate or committee is provided. 22
While it is often difficult to successfully wage a campaign against
the support of the regular political organization, usually a group of
incumbents, the most logical means of combatting "bossism" is to work
vigorously to establish one's own broad base of popular support. It,
of course, becomes easier to establish this popularity base if the "or-
ganization's" voice is muted. However, such a method blatantly im-
pinges upon the exercise of the first amendment right of free speech.
This is not even a case of constitutionally questionable prior re-
straints; 23 it is prior abolition.
The immediate effect of this rule is to segregate the elected official
from the constituency which elected him in the first place on the im-
portant issue of qualifications of prospective delegates to a national
political party convention which nominates a candidate for President. 24
If the Party intends to open up opportunities for the "little guy", its
methodology in this area is astonishingly offensive. Although it would
21. Findings and Report of Cecil F. Poole, Hearing Officer to Credentials Com-
mittee of the 1972 Democratic National Convention, 8-12 (June 25, 1972) [hereinafter
cited as The Findings].
The Credential Committee agreed with those findings in total in adopting its recom-
mendation to unseat the Chicago delegation.
22. MANDATE FOR REFORM 47.
23. Cf. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
24. When a Georgia legislature sought to unseat Julian Bond for speaking out
against Viet Nam, the Court ruled in favor of Bond, saying:
The manifest function of the First Amendment in a representative govern-
ment requires that legislators be given the widest latitude to express their
views on issues of policy .... (emphasis added)
Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).Query: Logically extending this guideline and its principles, what about an incumbent
President attempting to build up Congressional strength for his programs by his power
of candidate endorsement?
143
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be admirable to insure that everyone has reasonable access to the for-
mal machinery to participate as a voter2 1 or as a candidate,2" the bur-
den should thereafter be upon a candidate to gather his own support
rather than relying upon an artificial and probably unconstitutional
silencing of influential elected officials.
Guideline C-6 is similarly debilitated by its passage into the domain
of the first amendment. It imposes these requirements upon political
groups:
Furthermore, whenever slates are presented to caucuses, meet-
ings, conventions, committees or to voters in a primary, the Com-
mission requires State Parties to adopt procedures which assure
that: 1. The bodies making up the slates have been elected, as-
sembled, or appointed for the slate-making task with adequate
public notice that they would perform such task .... 27
In demanding that the public be given notice of when and where
groups intending to develop delegate slates will assemble, rights of free
association may be violated.28
While there have been cases which have authorized infringement of
first amendment rights for compelling reasons, these have generally
been restricted to the areas of national security. 29  Perhaps the case
most supportive of the party's right to inhibit political activity by offi-
cials not elected within the Presidential election year is United Public
Workers v. Mitchell.'0 There the Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Hatch Act, which prohibited partisan political activity by fed-
eral employees of the Executive Branch, on the rationale that Congress
had the power to regulate, within reasonable limits, the political con-
duct of federal government employees. 3 By analogy, it may be con-
stitutionally permissible for the Party to inhibit the political activity of
some of its members, in order to contribute to the democratic charac-
ter of its delegate selection. The Court, however, has not reconsid-
25. E.g., In Dunn v. Blumetein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) the Court struck down Ten-
nessee's durational requirements governing voting rights as violative of equal protection,
referring to that right in the familiar language of "a fundamental political right ...
preservative of all rights."
26. E.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) held that Ohio's election law
was so burdensome on third party efforts (in this case George Wallace's effort) to ob-
tain a designation on the ballot that it violated a right to an effective candidacy.
27. MANDATE FOR REFORM 48.
28. Cf., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957):
Our form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall have
the right to engage in political expression and association . . . . Exercise
of these basic freedoms in America has traditionally been through the media
of political associations . ...
29. E.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
30. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
31. Id. at 96.
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ered the Hatch Act, at least directly, for twenty-five years; therefore,
Mitchell's viability as strong precedent is questionable."2
Constitutional concern is also raised by the manner in which the
Guidelines handle the problem of discrimination on the basis of race,
nationality, age, and sex. Guideline A-1 requires that:
[S]tate Parties overcome the effects of past discrimination by af-
firmative steps to encourage minority group participation, includ-
ing representation of minority groups on the national convention
delegation in reasonable relation to the group's presence in the
population of the State. [Footnote 2 adds: "It is the under-
standing of the Commission that this is not to be accomplished by
the mandatory imposition of quotas."]33
It is difficult to reconcile the footnote prohibiting mandatory quotas
with the textual body requiring affirmative steps to achieve representa-
tion in reasonable relationship to the minority's presence in the popu-
lation. Such affirmative steps as including increased voter regis-
tration drives among minorities and perhaps slating those groups
in an affirmatively representative manner, may be constitutional.
However, if the affirmative steps include the imposition of post-election
adjustments to accomplish the goal, serious constitutional questions
concerning the denial of equal protection under the laws are raised.
To posit quotas in the textual language under one expression and then
to negate the concept in a direct footnote declaration smacks of soph-
istry.
Judge MacKinnon of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, although
upholding the Illinois unseating on the basis of Guideline C-6 viola-
tions, was deeply concerned about the validity of Guidelines A-1 and
A-2. In response to the argument that the Guidelines stand merely
32. One recent article contends that the Hatch Act would be found unconstitutional
today. Political Activity and the Public Employee: A Sufficient Cause for Dismissal?
64 Nw. U.L. REv. 736 (1969).
A recent federal district court case held unconstitutional the Hatch Act's prohibition
against federal employees taking "active part in political management or in political
campaigns." 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1971). The court urged that decisions subsequent to
United Public Workers v. Mitchell have obsolesced its holding, especially those cases
developing the "least restrictive alternative test" for governmental incursions into the
area of free speech. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. U.S. Civil Service
Comm., 41 U.S.L.W. 2069 (D.D.C. August 8, 1972) (three-judge court).
33. MANDATE FOR REFORM 40.
Guideline A-2, A-l's sister guideline, states in relevant part:
The Commission requires State Parties to overcome the effects of past dis-
crimination by affirmative steps to encourage representation on the national
convention delegation of young people--defined as people of not more than
thirty, nor less than . . . eighteen years of age-and women in reasonable
relationship to their presence in the population of the States. (Footnote 2
reads the same as above.)
MANDATE FOR REFORM 40.
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for an exhortation to State Parties to take strong affirmative action to
insure roughly proportional representation, the opinion stated:
Judge MacKinnon believes this argument somewhat disingenuous
and would conclude to the extent that the guidelines obviously
do create some required preference for such groups, they do repre-
sent the imposition of quotas which are a denial of equal protec-
tion of the laws to those groups that are fenced out.34
On the other hand, Judges Bazelon and Fahey would find the Guide-
lines constitutionally repugnant to the Equal Protection Clause only if
applied to justify the imposition of a post-electoral result quota. They
did not, however, read the language to demand such quotas.3 1
Judge MacKinnon distinguished the many federal court cases up-
holding quota employment laws to remedy past discrimination against
Blacks30 on the basis that "Illinois election laws do not operate in a
manner which deprives any individual of any race, sex, age, etc. from
the right to participate in any Illinois election as a candidate or elector
for any office."'3 7 The opinion reads:
Absent any violation of constitutional rights in the conduct of
elections in Illinois he [Judge MacKinnon] would find no justifi-
cation for an affirmative action program here and would accord-
ingly conclude that Guidelines A-1 and A-2 unconstitutionally deny
equal protection without the necessity for doing so to protect other
constitutional rights. [Emphasis added.]38
While Judge MacKinnon stressed the formal openness of the elec-
tion machinery, Credential Committee Hearing Officer Cecil Poole de-
fended his own decision, which recommended unseating, as not based
upon a quota imposition but upon the pre-existing informal and clandes-
tine operations of the Illinois State Party. He said:
From the mass of sharply conflicting evidence, there emerges a
clear pattern of concerted action by the organization in the use of
its influence and prestige in support of its regulars, encouraging
their candidacies, agreements on numbers, cooperation in the prep-
aration of sample ballots, their widespread distribution by party
workers, their prominence at headquarters of ward officials, and
34. Brown v. O'Brien et seq. (footnote 20 supra) at 17.
This per curiam slip opinion was authored in the rather unusual format of the
third person objective, almost as if none of the participating judges contributed to its
style. At stages where one of the three judges differed with the others, the opinion
would describe that variance.
35. id. at 16.
36. E.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert.denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); Contractors Association v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d
159 (3rd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
37. Brown v. O'Brien et. seq. (footnote 20 supra) at 18.
38. Id. at 18.
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the formidable array of party power in behalf of its preferred
candidates.3 9
He further added:
The Hearing Officer concludes, and finds, that the underrepre-
sentation complained of was not the result of fortune, unaffected
by the efforts of the organization, but was a continuation of the
same conditions exposed in the Commission Report and came
about because, although diligent in including its own regulars,
the organization in Chicago expended no such resources on the
segments of the population as required by Guidelines A-1 andA-2 .40
Poole's discrimination argument in effect relates back to the violations
of Guidelines C-4 and C-6 insofar as they demonstrated a failure to
take affirmative steps prior to the election to attain proportional repre-
sentation, and in fact demonstrated positive steps to perpetuate under-
representation among minorities.
The problem to a great extent lies in semantics and ambiguous ex-
pression. For the party to fulfill the due process requirement of ade-
quate notice, it will have to elucidate the meaning of Guidelines A-1
and A-2. Insofar as they advocate one constitutional guarantee-
freedom from discrimination-by the outright denial of another-
equal protection, they may contain constitutional defects. It is ironic
that in responding to the goal of the Equal Protection Clause, the par-
ty's means of attainment may be violating that very clause.
Many of the other Guidelines are admirable and seemingly consti-
tutional responses to the objective of democratic procedures. Guide-
lines governing publication of party rules (A-5), abolition of candi-
dacy and filing fees (A-4), public notice of party meetings involving
the delegate selection process (C-i), timely elections within the Presi-
dential election year (C-4), and others are valid rules furthering the
development of truly open, meaningful, and fully participatory elec-
tions of delegates.41 For these the party is to be commended.
39. The Findings 20.
40. Id. at 24.
Poole himself admitted that a quota system would probably be unconstitutional:
Any such principle would be encumbered by grave doubt in any case, but
its application here is unnecessary because the underrepresentation found was
so extreme as to indicate (with a high degree of conviction) a failure to open
up to fuller participation by those who have historically been excluded, as in-
tended by the Guidelines and the Call to the 1972 Convention. Id., at 5.
The alleged extreme underrepresentation was supported in the report by statistics.
Blacks, Latins, females and youth, representing 37%, 10%, 52%, and 30% of Chicago's
population constituted only 20%, 3%, 15%, and 8% respectively of the elected delega-
tion. Id. at 21.
41. MANDATE FOR REFORM 34 (Summary of the Guidelines).
These observations of the validity of the Democratic Party's guidelines, of course,
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A party, however, cannot deign itself the final authority on the con-
stitutionality of its rules, especially when it serves as one of the two
vital conduits in providing viable candidates for the Presidency as the
Democratic and Republican parties do. Our Constitution does not
subscribe to the Machiavellian maxim of the end justifying the means,
and the courts may see fit to review the party's actions to check that
such a philosophy is not motivating integral decisions in the Presiden-
tial election process.
THRESHOLD MATTERS: JURISDICTION AND JUSTICIABILITY
Before a court can intervene in the decisions of a national political
party, it must first determine whether it has jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the controversy.42 Then it must decide whether it is capable
of fashioning a remedy; that is, is the subject matter justiciable in this
context? This raises twin issues. The court must ask whether the de-
cisions of the national political party in the area of delegate selection
are such state action as to raise constitutional questions through the ab-
sorption system of the fourteenth amendment and its "no state
shall. . ." language. If it answers that issue affirmatively, the court
must then decide whether standards productive of manageable reme-
dies are available, a decision which is basically an offspring of the
political question doctrine.
have not so much been intended to exhaust the constitutional research as illustrate some
of the serious issues raised by many of them.
42. The question of subject matter jurisdiction presents a more difficult problem for
federal courts than state courts whose jurisdiction is general as a rule. The jurisdiction
of the lower federal courts is particularly limited.
The two federal district courts involved in the 1972 controversy split on this issue.
Judge Will held that no subject matter jurisdiction existed on a federal question basis
(28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1971) ). He contended that the relation of the national party
convention and its delegate seating methods to the U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § I (the
Presidential and Vice-Presidential electoral system) was too remote to constitute a
true federal question. Wigoda v. Cousins, 342 F. Supp. 82, 84 (N.D. Il1. 1972).
On the other hand, the District of Columbia District Court assumed jurisdiction of
the subject matter. Keane v. National Democratic Party, No. 1010-72 (D.D.C.
July 3, 1972).
Most of the specific statutory grants of jurisdiction speak to the State or state law.
E.g. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1971) (the basic Civil Rights statute). The resolution of
whether national political party activity is state action and then whether the "State" or
"state law" language in those statutes includes all forms of state action will determine
whether the statutory grant applies.
Other possible original jurisdictional bases are 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1971) (".
under color of any State law . . . regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege,
or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States . . ."); 28 U.S.C. § 1343
(4) (1971) (". . . to secure equitable relief under any Act of Congress, providing
for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote."); or 28 U.S.C. § 1344
(1971) (". . . to recover possession of any office except . . . [delegate?] . . . wherein
it appears that the sole question touching the title to office arises out of denial of the
right to vote . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.")
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State Action: A Question of Jurisdiction
The issue of whether a transaction is accountable to the fourteenth
amendment has been fallow territory for academic treatment.43 The
concept of "state action" has become so contorted that its highly lib-
eral definition in some cases has virtually eliminated it as a serious bar-
rier to constitutional review. 44  Nevertheless, in controversies involv-
ing political parties the considerations have ranged from an elaborate
syllogism finding state action45 to a lengthy justification of dismissal
of the complaint for a lack of state action.4"
43. E.g., Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action" Limit on
the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855 (1966); Williams, The Twi-
light of State Action, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 347 (1963).
44. E.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) where the fact that local courts
enforced racially restrictive property covenants in private house sales was enough to
call in the fourteenth amendment;
E.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308
(1968) in which a privately owned shopping plaza was considered the equivalent of a
public business center and thus subject to first amendment mandates (through the four-
teenth) to not totally suppress free expression, including picketing.
45. Georgia v. National Democratic Party, 447 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied 404 U.S. 858 (1971), the case deciding against the strict application of the
one-man, one-vote equation to the national political party's delegate allocation formula,
spoke at length on the state action issue in developing its right to hear the matter at all.
(Id., at 1274-1276). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals deemed the Texas White Pri-
mary Cases and the Reapportionment Cases of Gray v. Sanders [note 1 supra] com-
pelling analogies. The appearance in those cases of two different problems-racial
discrimination and equal protection in voting power-in various state political party
settings (primary, committee, and convention) was influential. The Court also viewed
the delegate-selection process to be as integral to the electoral system as the candidate
nomination process was in those cases. Finally, it justified the extension of that reason-
ing to national political parties since "the collective activity of all the states' delegates
at the national convention can be no less readily classified as state action." 447 F.2d
at 1275.
46. On the other hand, in Smith v. State Executive Committee of Democratic Party
of Georgia, 288 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Ga. 1968) in which case the petitioners com-
plained on an equal protection basis about the statutory scheme of committee appoint-
ment of delegates to the national political party convention, the Court declared that
state action required the performance of some state officer, and the gubernatorial
nominee's action, even if an incumbent, was in his capacity as party head rather than
head of state.
The Court chose to distinguish those White Primary and Reapportionment Cases,
which involved political parties, as restricted to the actual voting process by general
or primary election and not applicable to the remote selection of political party
delegates.
The Court further deemed Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) as doubtful au-
thority since its basis was the fifteenth amendment prohibition against racial dis-
crimination.
In the case of Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 370, 372 (3d Cir. 1965), in which non-
elective steps in the selection of a political party county chairman were attacked, the
federal court of appeals made this distinction which lends some support to the theory of
the non-existence of state action in our problem:
[T]he citizen's constitutional right to equality as an elector, as declared in the
relevant Supreme Court decisions, applies to the choice of those who shall be
his elected representatives in the conduct of government, not in the internal
management of a political party.
It should be noted, however, by comparison that a delegate's dominant function is
electoral, despite his committee participation in, for example, platform formulation.
He is, therefore, integrally involved in the choice of a truly governmental officer-the
Loyola University Law Journal
The latter treatment is probably explainable as an excuse not to
hear a controversial issue. The restraint schematic of the federal
courts including such concepts of state action and such doctrines as
political question, ripeness, mootness, and others are often unpredicta-
ble bases for constitutional review.
The assumption, explicated in Brown v. O'Brien,4 7 by the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, and implied in the October, 1972 Su-
preme Court remand of Keane v. National Democratic Party48 is that
the national political party's important function of nominating a Pres-
idential candidate constitutes state action. The remarks of Justice
Marshall's dissent, in the August, 1972, Supreme Court decision of
O'Brien v. Brown to stay the D.C. Circuit's order, are also appropriate:
[T]he action of the Party in these cases [the two challenges],
was governmental action, and therefore subject to the requirements
of due process. The primary election [to elect delegates], was,
by state law, the first step in a process designed to select a Demo-
cratic candidate for President; the State will include electors
pledged to that candidate on the ballot in the general election.
The State is intertwined in the process at every step, not only au-
thorizing the primary but conducting it, and adopting its result for
use in the general election. In these circumstances, the primary
must be regarded as an integral part of the general election. 49
Political Question: An Issue of Justiciability
Even if a court assumes jurisdiction, there still remain the questions
of whether the court should be involved in this type of subject matter
and whether it is capable of fashioning a judicial remedy. Courts
often ask themselves these questions before proceeding to the merits,
President of the United States. He can hardly be compared with a party chairman in
his role in internal political party affairs.
47. Brown v. O'Brien et. seq. (footnote 20 supra) at 6.
That court, faced with the 1972 credentials challenges summarily found state action
citing its elaborate development in Georgia v. National Democratic Party, 447 F.2d 1271
(D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 858 (1971): "We have no difficulty concluding
that defendants' National Democratic Party action against these delegates was state
action."
48. 41 U.S.L.W. 3182 (U.S. October 10, 1972).
49. 92 S. Ct. 2718, 2724 (Marshall J., dissenting).
It has also been the general consensus of articles treating this topic that the acts of
the national political party in its nominating convention are the acts of government,
whether or not its delegates come from a state in which delegate selection is controlled
by statute or state party rule and whether or not the originating system is primary,
committee, or convention. See Regulation of Political Parties: Vote Dilution in the
Presidential Nomination Procedure, 54 IowA L. REV. 470, 476 (1968). Chambers and
Rotunda, Reform of Presidential Nominating Conventions, 56 VA. L. REV. 179, 194
(1970); Constitutional Safeguards in the Selection of Delegates to Presidential Nomi-
nating Conventions, 78 YALE L.J. 1228, 1232 (1969).
But see One Man, One Vote and Selection of Delegates to National Nominating
Conventions, 37 U. CH. L. REV. 536, 538 (1970).
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and the controversy at issue is one of those situations when the inquiry
is highly relevant.
Therefore, a consideration possibly more significant than "state ac-
tion" in the area of political party affairs is that of the political ques-
tion. Baker v. Carr,5 ° the case which developed the concept at length,
categorized the doctrine's impact into two main thrusts: commitment
of the matter either by explicit Constitutional language or by tradi-
tional respect for the separation of powers to another branch of gov-
ernment,51 and confrontation with a subject matter incapable of judi-
cial resolution due to a lack of manageable standards. 2
Since it would strain the meaning of "another branch of govern-
ment" to categorize the national political party and its convention as
another branch of government merely because some of its members
are Congressmen or its role is integral to the election of the Executive,
the concept of separation of powers is viewed to have no deterrent ef-
fect on judicial review in our type of controversy. Justice Marshall
in his dissent in O'Brien v. Brown agreed:
Neither the executive nor the legislative branch of government
purports to have jurisdiction over the claims asserted in these
cases. Apart from the judicial forum only one other forum has
been suggested-the full convention of the National Democratic
Party-and that is most assuredly not a coordinate branch of gov-
ernment to which the federal courts owe deference within the
meaning of the separation of powers or the political question doc-
trine. 53
However, the second aspect of the political question doctrine-the
availability of justiciable standards-raises a more serious dilemma in
the context of these 1972 convention controversies.
One of the problems in the pre-Baker v. Carr days was that allega-
tions of malapportionment appeared before the Court as a violation of
50. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
51. Id. at 211.
52. Id. at 217.
The Court has cautioned, however, that the colloquial meaning of "political" does
not control the political question: "The objection that the subject matter of the suit is
political is little more than a play on words." Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540
(1927) (Justice Holmes), one of the White Primary Cases.
53. 92 S. Ct. 2718, 2723 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
However, in Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota, 399 F.2d 119,
121 (8th Cir. 1968) a panel of the Eighth Circuit, including now Supreme Court Jus-
tice Blackmun, dismissed a complaint concerning malapportioned counties in national
party delegate selection in a per curiam opinion:
Certainly we have here 'a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stand-
ards'. Perhaps, we also have the 'impossibility of a court's undertaking inde-
pendent resolution without expressing a lack of respect due coordinate
branches of government' (Quoting in part from Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
187, 217, 226 (1962)).
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the "republican form of government" constitutional standard, 54 and
were consequently dismissed as non-justiciable political questions. 55
It was not until the same matter appeared under the aegis of the Equal
Protection Clause that the Court said that "judicial standards under the
Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar;" '56 and that,
therefore, the matter of malapportionment is justiciable. This evalua-
tion of the manageability of the Equal Protection Clause was eventually
substantiated with the application of the simple equation of "one man-
one vote" to apportionment problems.5 7  This freed the Court from
superimposing its policy judgment on the States in holding that the
Constitution clearly intended each man's vote to be equally effective.
The quantifiable nature of the issue thus provided easy administration
and testing.
The standards, upon which the current claims in the national politi-
cal party challenges were based, were the Due Process Clause and
various first amendment rights, including freedom of speech and asso-
ciation and the right to vote. The subject matter which was to be
weighed on those scales was the National Democratic Guidelines as
drafted and as applied.
The application of the Guidelines presented little difficulty since the
standards of procedural due process, like those of equal protection, are
"well developed" and easily tested. What is required in this context
are the recurrent themes of clear notice as to what state party actions
are expected in order to comply with the Guidelines, and if an al-
leged violation occurs, an opportunity to be heard. 58  The failure to
meet these dictates of the Due Process Clause is what proved to be the
constitutional defect in the National Democratic Party's handling of the
California challenge.5 9
However, it is the substantive element of the Guidelines which raises
the real problem of justiciability.60  The Guidelines are the response
54. "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government ....... U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4.
55. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), for example, came up under this
basis and was dismissed as part of the "political thicket".
56. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962).
57. E.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964). The cases viewed all considerations other than arithmetical equality irrelevant.
58. Cf. Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961) (vague statute
chilling first amendment rights); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (a hearing at
a meaningful time in a meaningful manner).
59. See p. 157 infra.
60. By analogy, in one federal circuit court case, an equal protection argument by
an independent candidate, based upon the inequalities inherent in the political patronage
system of the two major political parties, was accepted as a statement of a claim upon
which relief could be granted. The dissent stressed the non-justiciability of such a
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to the "democratizing" mandate of the Party, but there is much room
for heated debate as to which standards will make the party a more
democratic organization. 61 It is an area which requires policy evalua-
tions, and the Court has long admitted, if not always practiced, that it
has neither the resources nor the time of other branches of government
to develop a studied solution.6 2  It was the issue of substantive consti-
tutionality which arose in the Illinois challenge and at least one court-
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals-found the matter amenable to
Constitutional standards. 63
This problem of manageability should not and has not prevented
the Court from setting certain standards to protect important first
amendment rights. If the party infringes upon important rights such
as free and private association in its admirable goal of achieving "full,
meaningful, and timely participation," the Court has the repertoire to
determine whether the infringement is constitutionally justifiable in
furthering other constitutional interests such as effective voting or
meaningful candidacy. It is not as if the Court is authoring the Guide-
lines; it is merely checking them for validity. The Court has not only
the ability but the obligation to do so.64
As with "state action", the political question doctrine is a slippery
concept which may serve as an excuse not to hear a case for some
other underlying reason. For example, the Court may have been im-
plicitly allowing the States lead time to clean their own malapportioned
claim to no avail:
A distinction should be drawn in this area between the rights of voters and
candidates for public office to be given equal treatment by the state in the
,mechanical aspects of the election process' . . . and remedies for alleged
abuses of the persuasion or electioneering aspects of the process. (Emphasis
added.)
Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook County, 435 F.2d 267, 271 (7th Cir.
1970) (dissent).
61. In fact, the issue of what is "democratic" is strikingly reminiscent of what is
"republican" which, as indicated above, was a non-justiciable standard according to the
Baker v. Carr court. Even the Equal Protection Clause was viewed by the dissent in
that case as unproductive of standards in certain settings:
In the last analysis, what lies at the core of this controversy is a difference of
opinion as to the function of representative government. . . . The federal
courts have not been empowered by the Equal Protection Clause to judge
whether this resolution of the State's internal political conflict is desirable or
undesirable, wise or unwise.
369 U.S. 186, 333 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
These same misgivings about superimposition of judicial policy are applicable to the
Due Process Clause, which is one of the dominant issues in the convention challenges.
62. This attitude of the Court is especially evident in non-review of Congressional
economic legislation. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An
Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REv. 34.
63. Brown v. O'Brien, et seq. (footnote 20 supra).
64. "A denial of Constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection; our
oath and our office requires no less of us." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566
(1964), protecting the right to an equal vote.
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houses prior to the series of Reapportionment Cases.65 Upon con-
tinued dereliction by the States, the Court in Baker v. Carr then inter-
vened but refused to overrule even the plurality opinion of Colegrove
v. Green.6" Therefore, when this Court-manufactured doctrine of the
political question appears in a prior case, it should not be viewed as
ironclad precedent for future recurrences. It may be that the time or
facts are not proper, that rehabilitative time is being granted, or some
other tacit motive is at work.
Therefore, despite these hurdles of state action and justiciability, a
court, observing a grievous injury or a great issue, will not often allow
the hurdles to become insurmountable. Almost as the injury intensi-
fies and the issue magnifies, so does the federal question grow, so does
state action increase, and so does justiciability become more imperative.
If the issues of the Democratic Convention of 1972 linger or recur,
the courts, including our highest court, must go to the merits of the
controversy, not permitting what seems to be an abstruse procedural
framework to deter them.
THE MERITS
In this labyrinth of sensitive political affairs, some members of the
Judiciary were not restrained from resolving or urging a resolution of
the 1972 National Democratic Party Convention credential challenges
on their legal merits.
Two days before the Convention was gaveled to order, Cook County
Circuit Court Judge Daniel A. Covelli issued an injunction restraining
the challengers from taking the seats of Illinois' elected delegation. 7
Although there was no formal opinion with his order, transcripts reveal
that his legal rationale was premised upon the supremacy of state law
in relation to a voluntary association rule such as that of a national
political party.68 He failed to find any legal right whereby a non-
65. In Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 399 F.2d 119, 120 (8th Cir. 1968),
where petitioners complained of a malapportioned state convention choosing delegates
to the national political party convention, that court dismissed the claim, stating:
One significant guideline fact is that in the many reapportionment cases the
courts have never moved in hastily. Instead, the attitude has been one of re-
luctance and of willingness to have the challenged body initially given the op-
portunity to attempt to reorganize itself.
66. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962), distinguishing Colegrove v. Green,
328 U.S. 549 (1946).
67. Wigoda v. Cousins, No. 72-CH2288 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 8, 1972).
68. The July 8 proceeding transcript reads:
The Court: A group of persons set themselves up and decided that they
would override the thousands of voters that had selected the delegates that
they had voted for and that had won. I don't think we have reached that
point in the United States yet.
Record at 116, Wigoda v. Cousins, No. 72-CH2288 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 8, 1972).
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governmental conference such as a political party convention could
contravene governmental law and prevail. He analogized the events
to a situation wherein a group such as the Knights of Columbus
passed a club rule allowing polygamy. He asked, in effect, if the gov-
ernment had outlawed such a marital mode, could the club rule "legal-
izing" it possibly stand?69
When widely divergent views generate from the same set of facts,
the fork usually occurs at the stage of primary definitions. In the pro-
ceeding in the Illinois trial, once Judge Covelli had designated the na-
tional political party a purely private organization, the remainder of
his legal theory rushed forward with continuity. Instead of entering
the realm of federal constitutional issues, the court chose to pit the
state statutes and constitution7 ° against the rule of a private organiza-
tion operating within the state of Illinois. There was no need to enter
into considerations of the fourteenth amendment since the party by
prior definition was private and without "state" characteristics. In this
context, it cannot be seriously argued that a private citizen, group of
citizens, or organization has the right to frustrate State electoral re-
sults-results which were cast and tabulated through State election
machinery, which the national political party chose to utilize. As a
truly legitimate interest of the State and its citizenry, such elections
may be regulated and enforced by organs of the State, including its
courts.
Other courts, however, differed in their views of a national political
party and its role in reference to a State. In dismissing an attempt to
remove the same controversy to Illinois' federal courts, Judge Hubert
Will proffered this suggestion:
This is not to suggest that the qualifications and eligibility of
delegates to national political party conventions is properly deter-
minable by state law or by state courts. If it were each of the
fifty states could establish the qualifications of its delegates to the
various party conventions without regard to party policy, an ob-
viously intolerable result. The proper forum for determination
of the eligibility of delegates to serve at such a convention is the
Credentials Committee of the party at such a convention. 71
69. Record at 89, Wigoda v. Cousins, No. 72-CH2288 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 31, 1972).
70. Illinois' new 1971 Constitution mandates that elections shall be "free and
equal," ILL. CONST. art. III, § 3; and the state statutes say that the election of
delegates and alternates ". . . to national nominating conventions . . .shall be made in
the manner provided in this Article 7 and not otherwise;" ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 46,
§ 7-1, et. seq. (1971).
71. Wigoda v. Cousins, 342 F. Supp. 82, 86 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
The Seventh Circuit concurred with Judge Will's reasoning:
[T]he reasoning and result set forth in the memorandum opinion of the dis-
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The district court further speculated that "an attempt by an individual
state to control a national convention of a party will necessarily fail
due to the limits of its own jurisdiction." 2  While this statement may
be technically correct, the state court through its power of injunction
over resident delegates and challengers demonstrated in Illinois how
such a court may obliquely extend its jurisdictional influence in quasi-
long arm fashion. When the delegate or challenger returns to his
home state, he may face contempt charges-a very high price in the
practice of his political beliefs.
Still another court viewed the issues in a different way. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, deliberating upon the merits in both
the Illinois and California credential challenges, held that as to the Illi-
nois controversy no inconsistency existed between Illinois' electoral laws
and the National Democratic Party's credential Guidelines.7 3 It,
therefore, found no need to treat the crucial confrontation in which
there would be a clear conflict between the state law and the party rule.
The Court reasoned:
The Illinois election law is, by itself, not incompatible with guide-
line C-6 of the McGovern Commission. [This guideline, pro-
hibiting private slate-making, was allegedly violated by Chicago's
regular political organization]. The guideline complements the
Illinois law in an area-selection of delegate slates-where the
state law is silent.74
The court then decided that a national political party, with its broad
freedom of association, can determine the qualifications of its conven-
tion membership, "if exercised within the confines of the Constitu-
tion."'7 5  It cautioned, however, that although the party serves a quasi-
governmental role in the important process of elections, and must
therefore operate in that role in a constitutional manner, a court must
act gingerly so as not to chill the party's important first amendment
right of association. The court said, "We begin with a firm conviction
that the political parties must have wide latitude in interpreting their
own rules and regulations. '7 6  In effect, the court was balancing the
interest of the people in executing the ballots they cast and the interest
of the party in free association. Both the right to vote and the right to
free association are important offspring of the first amendment, and
the scale must be delicate indeed.
trict court is now adopted as the opinion of this Court.
Wigoda v. Cousins, No. 72-1384 (7th Cir. June 30, 1972).
72. Wigoda v. Cousins, 342 F. Supp. 82, 87 (N.D. 111. 1972).
73. Brown v. O'Brien, et. seq. (footnote 20 supra) at 16.
74. Id. at 16. The court did not explain away the "and not otherwise" language
in the Illinois statute. See note 70, supra.
75. Id. at 16.
76. Id. at 9.
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Without treating each of the alleged guideline violations since the
violation of one would be sufficient grounds for unseating the delega-
tion, the court decided that Guideline C-6 contained no constitutional
infirmity as written or as applied, and therefore upheld the right of the
National Democratic Party to unseat the elected delegation from Illi-
nois. 77
The jolting impact of this court's decision was that a national politi-
cal party convention was empowered to strip State delegates of their
elected official status and to thereby disenfranchise those who voted
for them. In other words, the Party could apply the strictest of penal-
ties-negation of electoral ballots-to enforce its policy.
Still unanswered, however, was the dilemma of a state law and a
convention rule directly in conflict, but the California challenge ap-
parently contained the ripe setting. It seemed that the California
challenge would precipitate the head-on clash between the law and the
rule insofar as California's "winner-take-all" state primary laws7 8 ran
directly contrary to the Credentials Committee's interpretation of the
mandate itself79 and Guideline B-680 as a prohibition of such delegate
primaries. The court, however, was once again able to avoid the
necessity of resolving the legal issue of direct contravention when it
quite properly found that the application of the Guidelines was con-
stitutionally defective in other respects. In noting the constitutional
importance of the process of electing the President of the United States,
the opinion held that integral steps in that election must be subject to
the standards of due process. Guideline B-6 was viewed as textually
"vague" and applied in virtual ex post facto style insofar as the manda-
tory character of the guideline was unclear and the "clarification" by
the Credentials Committee postdated the California primary."1
77. Id. at 16.
Query: Can the first amendment rights of one group be enhanced at the expense
of those same rights in another group?
78. CAL. GEN. LAWS ANN., Elec. C.A. § 6386 (Deering, 1971) reads:
The Secretary of State shall issue a certificate of election to each person who
is a member of the delegation which received the largest vote cast for any
delegation of the Democratic Party, such person thereby being elected as dele-
gate or alternate to the Democratic National Convention.
79. ". . . [the convention shall require that:
1. The unit rule not be used in any stage of the delegate selection process.
." 1968 DEMOCRATIC PROCEEDINGS 269.
80. .... The Commission believes a full and meaningful opportunity to participate
in the delegate selection process is precluded unless the presidential preference of each
Democrat is fairly represented at all levels of the process . . . . The Commission be-
lieves that there are at least two different methods by which a State Party can provide
for such representation. First, in at-large elections it can divide delegate votes among
presidential candidates in proportion to their demonstrated strength.... ".MANDATE
FOR REFORM 44.
81. Brown v. O'Brien, et seq. (see footnote 20 supra) at 12.
In addition, Guideline B-6 was in the category of "urged" recommendations whereas,
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The tremendous legal significance of this part of the decision is that,
insofar as the party's right of association permits the establishment of
Guidelines by which to measure the qualifications of its associates,
those Guidelines, especially in the context of an integral step in the
Presidential election process, are subject to judicial review for consti-
tutionality.
Therefore, in the Illinois challenge, the court found one Guideline
constitutional on its face and as applied, and allowed the drastic meas-
ure of unseating. In the California dispute, it found another guide-
line constitutionally violative of due process for its vagueness and as
retroactively applied, and would not allow the drastic steps of disen-
franchisement.
What remains for interesting conjecture (in fact, all is conjecture
given the decisions of the Supreme Court) is the setting in which not
only is the state electoral law constitutional, but the party guideline is
also constitutional on its face and as applied. Nevertheless, the two
conflict in a vital provision. For example, if the National Democratic
Party clarifies its firm resolution to bar "winner-take-all" primaries in
the 1976 delegate elections and the California state law remains the
same, at least partially due to no state party effort to change it, and
the Court views both "winner-take-all" and "winner-take-part" systems
constitutional, there exists the classic head-to-head clash.
On this point and in anticipation of it presenting itself, the Demo-
cratic Party argued in its brief that its status as a private voluntary or-
ganization and its imperative right of unfettered association dictated
that neither a court nor a state has a right to impair its decisions, in-
cluding those decisions whether or not to honor the delegate selections
from a state.8 2 It further contended that since its concerns are national
in scope while the states' interests are inherently parochial in perspec-
tive, the local unit must not be allowed to frustrate the national pur-
pose and policies surrounding Presidential nominations and ultimately
elections. To support this concept, the party argued:
At bottom, the Supremacy Clause, Article VI, is involved for if a
state could frustrate the procedures of the national parties which
nominate the President and Vice-President, it would thereby in-
by contrast, the Guidelines confronting the Chicago delegation were "required" recom-
mendations, meaning that all feasible steps had to be taken by the State Party to
achieve those Guideline demands. MANDATE FOR REFORM 34-37.
82. Brief for Defendant (National Democratic Party) p. 10, Keane v. National
Democratic Party, No. 1010-72 (D.D.C. July 3, 1972).
This brief is sufficient to depict not only the arguments of the Party but also those of
the challenger delegations. It is also adequate to substantially reflect the legal argu-
mentation espoused by these parties from this federal district court through the United
States Supreme Court.
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terfere in a fundamental way with the executors of federal law. 83
The party proclaimed that it would not interfere with but would
honor the electoral results of the various states if the elections
complied with the national party rules "designed to assure fair repre-
sentation of all party members in all the states."84
The party's argument, although expressive of some valid concerns,
is inconsistent in other respects. For example, it disclaims the trait
of state action for purposes of jurisdiction, yet considers itself the "ex-
ecutor" of federal law when its rules contravene state law.85 Further-
more, despite protests to the contrary, some of the party Guidelines
are de facto interference with state elections. Guidelines in conflict
with state law (for example, a future requirement abolishing "winner-
take-all" primaries) say, in effect: "Change your law (or make all
feasible efforts) or we will not effectuate your electoral results at our
convention." Such a policy stands for a respect of state law if it hap-
pens to coincide with party philosophy. The party's argument would
therefore be more frankly stated if it forthrightly contended that its
rules are in all instances superior to state law, at least for purposes of
delegate seating at its convention.
The challenged delegations' briefs, on the other hand, argued that
the right to vote is so sacrosanct that it cannot be infringed by a state,
much less a political party, to execute even the most noble policies.
The elected Illinois delegation spoke to the issue in these words:
Because the right to vote is fundamental, it cannot be abridged,
either by the state or any organization possessing governmental
powers. Such abridgments are subject to the most exacting scru-
tiny and can be upheld only if necessary to promote a compelling
state interest: (citations omitted) . . . . It is thus not sufficient
for the party to show the abridgement of the right to vote is merely
rationally related to an otherwise legitimate party purpose. Thus,
the position of the defendants before this court that enforcement
of the McGovern Commission guidelines is necessary to effectuate
(sic) alleged past practices or to broaden the participation of
voters in party affairs is insufficient to justify the drastic measure
of disenfranchising seven hundred thousand votes.86
83. Id. at 31.
Interestingly, Illinois trial court Judge Covelli turned this argument around so that the
state law was deemed supreme in relation to a private political party rule. See p. 155
supra.
84. Id. at 31A.
85. Id. at 10, 31. This style of argumentation, ranging from claims of the
non-existence of "state" law to the execution of the highest law of the land-the federal
law, is, of course, partially attributable to the rights of alternative pleading.
86. Petitioner's (Illinois' elected delegation) Brief for Writ of Certiorari, p. 26,
O'Brien v. Brown, 92 S. Ct. 2718 (1972).
This brief substantially reflected the basic arguments of both challenged delegations
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The theory further branched by corollary to the right of an effective
candidacy, including a candidacy as a national political party delegate,
which right is protected by the fourteenth amendment.8"
The courts are then hypothetically faced with the crucial considera-
tion currently unanswered in American case law as to the status of na-
tional political parties in relation to other organizations, especially the
states. It is the answer to this preliminary question which will allow
many of the sub-issues to flow inexorably from it.
The issue is a difficult one. Will the states be allowed to frustrate
uniform national political party policy by the absolute imposition of
electoral results possibly derived from undemocratic processes? Con-
versely, will the party be allowed to cancel out electoral results in state
delegate elections on the basis that the methods did not abide by party
ideals? The danger at the one end is that undemocratic state electoral
processes-and there are undeniably many 8s-will perpetuate indef-
initely unless spurred to amendatory practices. The peril at the other
end is that the party, in the volatile milieu of a national convention,
may unseat delegates under the pretense of a guideline violation when
the underlying motive is political in its most colloquial sense.89 There
is additionally the risk of muting or misrepresenting the voices of
thousands of voters in the name of democracy with no time for polling
their choices in a new "democratic" election.
The solution to this problem lies in an analysis of the underlying
subject matter at stake. At the bottom of this maze of arguments lies
an important stage in the election of the President and Vice-President
of the United States. Although these contests are of great concern to
states such as Illinois and California, the total interest is larger than
either or both of those states. In short, the Presidential election is not
a mere state interest but a crucial national interest, and it is this in-
terest, and virtually this interest alone, which is the dominating force
in the roles of the national political parties. What are the national
political parties but concerts of all the states engaged in the formulation
of national policies in the vital elimination process of Presidential
candidates? Certainly we cannot permit the individual states to sap
although, of course, the arguments concerning the validity of the particular guidelines
are necessarily individual.
87. Id. at 25.
88. See note 12 supra.
89. E.g., The Rhode Island challenge, also based upon a "winner-take-all" primary
prohibition basis, was defeated in the Credentials Committee despite no apparent factual
or legal differences from the California challenge. Chicago Tribune, July 4, 1972, at
2, col. 1.
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the strength behind national coalitions, which in a gestalt sense are
larger than even the sum of their parts-the individual states.
The national political parties and their processes may not be the
ideal organs to facilitate the Presidential election. Modem movements
toward constitutional amendment of the entire Presidential election
system arise with great frequency.9" Congress has invaded the process
by making uniform for national election purposes age and residency re-
quirements, and the Court upheld the constitutionality of the legisla-
tion.91 It may do more, possibly requiring a national political party
primary or uniform state primaries for Presidential candidates. How-
ever, until such events transpire, the national political party convention
system with its many drawbacks must suffice. Certainly, total autonomy
of the states with their fragmented views of how to best handle Presi-
dential elections is an inferior alternative. Let the individual states feed
input into the formulation of that uniform national political party poli-
cy, but once the policy is determined, let all states be bound. The elec-
tion of the President and Vice-President of the United States and all
its antecedent steps are too vital for the result to be otherwise.
The political parties, however, will carry the scars of a Pyrrhic vic-
tory in obtaining a power of disenfranchisement to execute their poli-
cies, for if these Presidential electoral steps are so crucial, the formu-
lation and implementation of the policies affecting that election must
be reviewable for constitutional character. Consistency demands such
a conclusion. Therefore, although the party will have been granted
the power to implement its necessarily national policy through its rules,
the high price will have been the reviewability of its decisions by the
courts, and thus an infringement upon its jealously guarded inde-
pendence and its traditionally wide-open life style. Its mandates will
be reviewable for substantive and procedural constitutionality. If a
rule is substantively unconstitutional, it will not be allowed to negate
state electoral results. If a party rule is substantively constitutional,
the state must have adequate notice of its meaning in time to adjust
or attempt to adjust to its demands.
Furthermore and if at all possible, the courts should expect the party
to resolve challenges quickly enough to allow for a new election. This
would remove important fact-finding and decision-making matters
90. See Bayh, Electing a President-The Case for Direct Popular Election, 6
HARv. J. LEGIS. 127 (1969); Claude, Nationalization of the Electoral Process, 6
HARV. J. LEGIS. 139 (1969); and David, Reforming the Presidential Nomination
Process, 27 LAw & CONTEMP. PROa. 159 (1962).
91. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1971).
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from the mercurial climate of convention time, and, more importantly,
impose a good faith duty upon the party to attempt to preserve the vote
of the electorate.92
PREVIEW OF THE SUPREME COURT'S VIEW OF THE MERITS
The United States Supreme Court, while refusing to consider the
merits of the controversy-at least under the circumstances of the 1972
Democratic Convention challenges, nevertheless leaked impressions of
what it considered the merit issues to be. The per curiam opinion re-
vealed this response:
Thus these cases involve claims of the power of the federal judi-
ciary to review actions heretofore thought to lie in the control of
political parties. Highly important questions are presented con-
cerning justiciability, whether the action of the Credentials Com-
mittee is state action, and if so the reach of the Due Process
Clause in this unique context. Vital rights of association guar-
anteed by the Constitution are also involved.9 3
The dissent by Justice Marshall viewed the issues in a similar light,
but he wanted to do more than state the issues; he wanted to adjudicate
them. He and Justice Douglas, who concurred with the dissent, ob-
served these conflicts generating from the controversies:
While the delegates couch their arguments in various ways all of
the arguments boil down to these two: i.e. they have been denied
due process and the voters who elected them have been denied an
opportunity to vote for the candidate of their choice.94 . . Thus
when the Party deprived the candidates of their status as dele-
gates it was obliged to do so in a manner consistent with the de-
mands of due process. 95 . . . In the cases before this Court, it is
claimed that the presidential primary is an integral part of the
election machinery and that the right to vote in the presidential
primary has been impaired. That claim should be heard and de-
cided on its merits, certainly not by the use of the stay mechanism
in lieu of granting certiorari and plenary consideration.96
92. Of course, as is illustrated by the factual settings behind the 1972 Democratic
Convention challenges, a new election may not always cure the irreparable damage.
For example, a candidate may have already expended considerable energy on the prem-
ise of a "winner-take-all" primary suddenly changed to a prorated election. In a like
manner, the "organization" cue (if the Guidelines stripping its influence are consti-
tutional; see p. 143) may have already been transmitted, and a new election cannot
silence that fact. Therefore, in some cases, early expeditious treatment of the chal-
lenges may provide a deliberative milieu, but a new election would either be unfair or
meaningless.
93. O'Brien v. Brown, 92 S. Ct. 2718, 2720 (1972).
94. Id. at 2721, n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 2724.
96. Id. at 2726.
Vol. 4: 137
1972 Democratic Convention
Therefore, the Court through this opinion observed issues of first
amendment rights of association, voting, and candidacy in addition to
questions of due process of law. It, however, did not speak to the
controversy of the relationship of the national polical party and its
rules to the states and their electoral results, for in fact, there may
not have been a direct conflict of the two as indicated in the opinion
of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.9 7
VICIOUS CIRCLE: BRIEF TIME BETWEEN RIPENESS AND MOOTNESS
When the courts are again thrust into the affairs of national politi-
cal parties, there remain the extremely difficult considerations of when
to hear the controversy and what remedy to fashion.
The District of Columbia District Court initially assumed jurisdic-
tion of the Illinois matter prior to the proceedings before the Creden-
tials Committee Hearing Officer.9" The District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals, however, viewed assumption of the matter as pre-
mature and vacated the District Court's order.90 Therefore, one court
concluded such matters were not ripe at the very least until the Con-
vention Hearing Officer heard the factual arguments and made un-
favorable recommendations to the Credentials Committee.
The events of 1972 illustrate the severe mechanical problems in-
herent in the current system of both convention and judicial review.
The convention challenge machinery does not begin to function until
shortly before the convention. For example, Hearing Officer Poole's
fact finding report on the Illinois situation was issued on June 25,
1972, approximately two weeks before the convention. 10 One week
later on July 1, 1972, the Credentials Committee nurtured the apple of
ripeness to a ruddier shade by accepting the fact-finding reports on the
Illinois and California challenges. 101 If the controversy had not been
ripe before, the apple had fallen off the tree by the time the District of
Columbia Courts reconsidered the problem. When the matter ap-
peared before the District Court on July 3, 1972102 less than one week
remained before the convention was to commence formal activities.
In five days, three federal courts (District of Columbia District,
97. Brown v. O'Brien, et seq. (footnote 20 supra). In addition, see p. 156.
98. Keane v. National Democratic Party, No. 1010-72 (D.D.C. June 19, 1972).
See footnote 18 supra for a detailed description of all the court action in the 1972
Democratic Convention controversies.
99. Keane v. National Democratic Party, No. 72-1562 (D.C. Cir. June 20, 1972).
100. The Findings at 1.
101. Chicago Tribune, July 1, 1972 at 1, col. 5 and at 3, col. 3 respectively.
102. Keane v. National Democratic Party, No. 1010-72 (D.D.C. July 3, 1972).
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that same jurisdiction's Circuit and the United States Supreme Court)
decided whether to adjudicate the issues. The first two did; our high-
est court did not. In fact, the Supreme Court pushed the doctrine of
ripeness to its logical limit when it attributed, among other factors,
this element as its basis for refraining:
In light of the availability of the convention as a forum to review
the recommendations of the Credentials Committee, in which proc-
ess, the complaining parties might obtain the relief they have
sought from the federal courts . . ., we conclude the judgments of
the Court of Appeals must be stayed.103
Therefore, the federal judicial doctrine of "ripeness", developed to
discourage advisory opinions as contrary to the "case and controversy"
language of Article 111,104 has forced the courts in this syndrome into
a "rushed deliberation" if they are to fashion a remedy for a current
controversy. This environment can hardly be deemed conducive to
sound judicial review of important legal issues, including the presenta-
tion of some matters of first impression. The Supreme Court said in
this regard:
[I]f this system is to be altered by federal courts in the exercise
of their extraordinary equity powers, it should not be done under
the circumstances and time pressures surrounding the actions
brought in the District Court, and the expedited review in the
Court of Appeals and this Court.10 5
The doctrine of ripeness, compounded by understandable demand
for judicial deliberation, has then drawn half the orb of the proverbial
vicious circle. The circle is bottomed out by the doctrine of mootness,
developed by the Court to prevent the use of its time in matters once
suitable for adjudication but in which subsequent events have removed
that need.' The result is virtually: "you can't bring it too early and
you can't bring it too late--even if the only time you can bring it is too
late because we won't let you bring it any earlier."
The Court, in the convention controversy, stated that "we recognize
103. O'Brien v. Brown, 92 S. Ct. 2718, 2720 (1972).
104. E.g., United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) said: As is well
known, the federal courts, established pursuant to Article III, do not render advisory
opinions. For adjudication of constitutional issues concrete legal issues, presented in
actual cases, not abstractions, are requisite.
105. O'Brien v. Brown, 92 S. Ct. 2718, 2720 (1972).
106. A comic-tragic application of this doctrine occurred where after sitting on a
case for two and one-half years, the Court refused to consider a child labor law regu-
lating youth under sixteen on the basis that the plaintiff's passage of his sixteenth
birthday "mooted" the question. Atherton Mills v. Johnston, 259 U.S. 13 (1922).
Query: For a Court whose concerns and decisions stretch beyond the actual liti-
gants, should moot cases which produce a substantial record from the pre-existing ac-
tual case or controversy be automatically stricken from consideration?
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that a stay of the Court of Appeals judgments may well preclude any
judicial review of the final action of the Democratic National Conven-
tion on the recommendation of its Credentials Committee.' 10 7 In
other words, the Court had entrusted the finality of crucial Presidential
election decisions to the unpredictable fate of a political convention
floor vote. This is truly a case of a vanishing controversy.
By interesting contrast, Justice Marshall initially spoke of an alter-
native review after the convention floor decision but during conven-
tion week and then stated:
If we wait even longer-until the national convention is over-
and ultimately sustain the delegates' claims on the merits, we
would have no choice but to declare the convention null and void
and to require that it be repeated. The dispute in these cases con-
cerns the right to participate in the machinery to elect the Presi-
dent of the United States. If participation is denied, there is no
possible way for the underlying disputes to become moot. The
drastic remedy that delay might require should be avoided at all
costs. [emphasis added] 108
He then concluded:
It is unfortunate that cases like these must be decided quickly or
not at all, but sometimes that cannot be avoided. Where there
are no substantial facts in dispute and where the allegation is
made that a right as fundamental as the right to participate in
the process leading to the election of the President of the United
States is threatened, I believe that our duty lies in making deci-
sions, not avoiding them. 10 9
One particularly encouraging recent case to those who hope for a
resolution of the important issues generated by these challenges is
Moore v. Ogilvie."' Even though the judicial machinery was too
cumbersome to react to a complaint based upon Illinois' 1968 electoral
restrictions governing the placement of third parties on its ballot, the
Court said, in overturning those restrictions, that the criterion for be-
lated review in such cases should be whether "the problem is . . .
capable of repetition yet evading review.''' This case, although not
107. O'Brien v. Brown, 92 S. Ct. 2718, 2720 (1972).
108. Id. at 2723 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 2726.
Of instructive value is the thinking employed in the case of Maxey v. Washington
State Democratic Committee, 319 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Wash. 1970). There the federal
district court, confronted with a controversy of alleged malapportionments in state
methods of selection of 1972 national political party delegates, allowed the procedural
device of the declaratory judgment to justify the court's decision to hear the matter
nearly two years before it would ripen according to the federal injunction standards
enunciated above.
110. 394 U.S. 814 (1969).
111. Id. at 816, quoting the standard espoused in Southern Pacific Terminal Co.
165
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particularly soothing to the losing sides in the 1972 Democratic Con-
vention controversies, indicates that the Court may yet provide a pro-
spective remedy. 11 2
Another exception to the mootness doctrine has been based upon
the existence of collateral effects. Although this exception has been
most notably applied in criminal cases (for example, a two-time los-
er often receives more severe sentences),113 it has not been restricted to
that category." 4  In the Illinois challenge, two issues remained alive
after the convention. One, and by far the most important, collateral ef-
fect was the violation against the state court injunction by the challeng-
ers who took their delegate seats contrary to that order.115 The sec-
ond was the right to vote as delegates after the convention for the state's
national political party committeeman and committeewoman. No simi-
lar collateral consequences lingered in the California challenge. Per-
haps, this is the reason that the Supreme Court in its October, 1972, re-
view of the writs for certiorari, found outright that the California issues
were moot while remanding the Illinois issues to the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals to determine the very question of mootness. 1" 6
If the Court assumes jurisdiction and goes to the merits, it is faced
with the difficult task of fashioning a creative remedy-whether it be
solely prospective, partially retroactive (the possible collateral effects
in Illinois if the unseating was deemed constitutional or unconstitu-
tional), or absolutely retroactive (invalidation of the convention or
Presidential election). If the Court's remedy is prospective, the range
of its dicta to influence future proceedings will be important since it is
unlikely that the issues will recur exactly as they arose in the Illinois
and California challenges." 7
v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
One author, gathering an impressive array of recent authority, thinks that the Court
will eventually abandon the doctrine of mootness and play a guiding role by setting
out rules for future behavior. Singer, Justiciability and Recent Supreme Court Cases,
21 ALA. L. REV. 229 (1969).
112. In fact, the Court even refused to find moot one case, in which union election
laws of questionable legality were amended during the pendency of litigation, on the
basis of possible re-enactment of the old by-laws once litigation concluded. Wirtz v.
Hotel, Motel, & Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492 (1968).
113. E.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
114. E.g., Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo.
1968), a student disciplinary action case based upon civil rights jurisdiction.
115. Wigoda v. Cousins, No. 72 CH 2288 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1972), still pending resolu-
tion.
116. O'Brien v. Brown and Keane v. National Democratic Party, 41 U.S.L.W. 3182
(U.S. October 10, 1972) (See note 4 supra).
117. For an elaborate discussion of procedural methods available to the courts in
enforcing its orders in political party contexts, see Note, Regulation of Political Parties
Vote Dilution in the Presidential Nomination Procedure, 54 IowA L. REv. 470, 485
(1968).
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CONCLUSION
The national political parties by the very nature of their national
purpose must prevail over individual states in the area of Presidential
nominations when conflicts between the two arise. However, since
the parties are quasi-governmental bodies, endowed with attributes of
state action, their policies, such as those illustrated by the 1972 Na-
tional Democratic guidelines, must be reviewable for constitutional
substance and application by courts empowered with the capacity and
standards to adjudicate such activities, and at a time sufficient to pro-
vide current or future relief.
The oft-quoted words of Justice Pitney in Newberry v. United States
have continued vitality today:
It seems to me too clear for discussion that primary elections and
nominating conventions are so closely related to the final election,
so vital to representative government that power to regulate them
is within the general authority of Congress. It is a matter of com-
mon knowledge that the great mass of the American electorate is
grouped into political parties, to one or the other of which voters
adhere with tenacity, due to their divergent views on questions of
public policy, their interests, their environment, and various other
influences, sentimental and historical. So strong with the great
majority of voters are party associations, so potent the party slo-
gan, so effective the party organization, that the likelihood of a
candidate succeeding in an election without a party nomination is
practically negligible. As a result, every voter comes to the polls
on the day of the general election confined in his choice to those
few candidates who have received party nominations . . . . As a
practical matter, the ultimate choice of the mass of voters is pre-
determined when the nominations have been made." 8
JEFFREY J. KENT
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118. 256 U.S. 232, 285 (1921), dissenting to a portion of the majority opinion
striking down the Federal Corrupt Practices Act as unconstitutional.
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